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Abstract—The necessity for secured communication devices that has limited computing power has encouraged the development of key 
generation scheme. The generation of a symmetric key scheme that utilizes randomness of wireless channels offers a most promising 
solution as a result of the easy distribution of secret key mechanisms. In the last few years, various schemes have been proposed, but 
there are trade-offs between the performance parameters used. The expected parameters are the low Key Disagreement Rate (KDR), 
the high Key Generation Rate (KGR), and the fulfillment of standard of randomness. In this paper, we propose the use of a 
combination of pre-processing methods with multilevel lossy quantization to overcome the trade-off of performance parameters of the 
Secret Key Generation (SKG) scheme. Pre-process method used to improve reciprocity so as to reduce KDR, whereas multilevel 
quantization is used to improve the KGR. We use Kalman as the pre-processing method and Adaptive Quantization, Modified Multi-
Bit (MMB), and 2-ary Quantization as the multilevel lossy quantization. Testing is conducted by comparing the performance between 
direct quantization with the addition of the pre-processing method in various multilevel lossy quantization schemes. The test results 
show that the use of Kalman as pre-processing methods and multilevel lossy quantization can overcome the trade-off performance 
parameters by reducing KDR and increasing KGR, with the best performance, was obtained when we use adaptive quantization. The 
resulting secret key has also fulfilled 6 random tests with p values greater than 0.01. 
 




In modern communication systems, data security efforts 
are crucial, especially for communication in wireless 
networks [1]-[5]. This underlines the need for a shared secret 
key to secure communication through the public network. 
Public key cryptography method is often used to build a 
secret key management system [6], but it relies on a 
problematic computation that is less attractive to most of 
Internet of Thing (IoT) applications [7]-[14]. Also, as the 
number of devices increases, the complexity of the secret 
key distribution also increases. The most appropriate 
solution to solve the problem is the secret key generation 
(SKG) scheme that utilizes the randomness of the wireless 
channel to get the secret key [15]-[20]. 
There are three properties of wireless channels that can be 
utilized to improve the secret key, i.e. reciprocity, variations 
in temporal and spatial variations. Reciprocity shows the 
similarity of multipath properties of the radio channel (gain, 
phase shift, and delay) of each user. Switching devices, 
human movement as well as objects will result in changes in 
multipath channels known as temporal variations. Another 
property of radio channels is the location uniqueness of two 
legitimate users. Eavesdroppers that are in the third location 
and more than half the wavelength of legitimate users will 
get different measurement results [21]-[24]. 
Some research shows that the secret key generation 
schemes run on two wireless devices using 802.11a radio 
can generate a secret key up to 1 bps [25]-[26]. These 
conditions resulted in the inability of the key length 
produced to achieve the minimum length of important keys 
due to a possible lost connection. The encryption method of 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a minimum 
length of 128-bit keys requires at least 2 minutes for 
generating the secret key. This serves as the basis for several 
new studies to increase the rate of key generation. 
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One viable solution to increase the key generation rate is 
using devices with multiple antennas [27]. However, this 
requires the addition of new protocols to ensure the success 
of the secret key generation mechanism. Another viable way 
without the addition of a new protocol is the optimization of 
multilevel schemes [28]-[30] either with a lossless or loss 
scheme. A lossless quantization scheme maps some wireless 
channel samples into some bits. No samples are discarded so 
the key generation rate can increase, but bit matches between 
two users may decrease. The loss scheme discards some 
samples that are located inside the interval guard. This 
scheme can increase the bit match between two users but the 
key generation rate decreases. 
In general, three performance parameters are often used to 
determine the success of established secret key generation 
scheme, i.e., Key Generation Rate (KGR), Key 
Disagreement Rate (KDR), and randomness [31]. KGR 
shows the number of key bits generated in the duration of the 
measurement. KDR indicates a mismatch of quantization 
bits, whereas randomness indicates the randomness value of 
the secret key generated. As indicated by [29] and [31] there 
is always a trade-off between those parameters. Some 
researchers used a lossless scheme to increase KGR, but the 
resulting KDR would also increase; other researchers used a 
loss scheme to lower the KDR, but it resulted in a decrease 
in KGR. Because the secret key generation scheme aims to 
generate identical keys between two users, the quantization 
that generates high KDRs is not often used. Some 
researchers used pre-process schemes to improve the 
reciprocity channel in order to decrease KDR [30]. To 
overcome the problem of multilevel performance parameters, 
the use of a combination of pre-processing schemes with 
multilevel quantization can be considered to obtain low 
KDR while still obtain high KGR. 
In this paper, we will prove that the use of a combination 
of pre-processing methods with quantization of multilevel 
loss can overcome trade-off performance parameters as 
compared to the use of multilevel quantization directly. We 
used Kalman for the pre-processing method because this 
method can improve the reciprocity even to data that have a 
low correlation [28]. Our specific research contributions are: 
• Conducting a performance analysis of the SKG scheme 
that performs a combination of the Kalman method with 
a multilevel loss scheme in an indoor environment. We 
used all the existing multilevel loss quantization schemes. 
To our knowledge, our research was the first that focused 
on performance comparisons of a multilevel loss 
quantization scheme. In addition to the research 
conducted by [28], we included the security factor by 
ensuring that the correlation of eavesdroppers did not 
exceed 0.5 and KDR exceed 0.25 (25%). With such a 
correlation and KDR value, eavesdroppers would not get 
the same key as legitimate users. 
• Presenting the experimental results on performance 
comparisons between direct quantization methods and the 
addition of the Kalman method before quantization. The 
test results showed an increase in both KGR and KDR 
performance parameters with the addition of Kalman 
before quantization. KDR between a legitimate user and 
eavesdropper even increased to increase the security 
factor of the scheme built. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 describes the material and method. Section 3 
presents the results and discussion. Finally, section 4 
presents the conclusion. 
II.  MATERIAL AND METHOD 
In this section will be explained in detail about the model, 
system design, and performance parameters used. The 
system model is used to determine the communication 
system carried out by legitimate users and tappers. The 
system design shows the steps used to generate the secret 
key along with the algorithm used, while the performance 
parameters are used to show the success of the system being 
built. 
A. Principle and Preliminaries 
This paper used a system model as shown in Fig. 1. The 
wireless communication system carried out by two 
legitimate users was Alice and Bob and an eavesdropper as a 
third party, i.e., Bob. The channel characteristics measured 
by Alice was Ah  and Bh  for Bob. Based on the principle of 
channel reciprocity that shows the similarity of channel 
characteristic, if the measurement is conducted in coherence 
time, it can be argued that A Bh h≈  [25], [26]. Some 
measurements n  obtained by Alice and Bob are shown in 
Equation (1) and (2).  
 
[ (1) (2) (3) ... ( )]A A A A Ah h h h h n= + + + +   (1) 
 
[ (1) (2) (3) ... ( )]B B B B Bh h h h h n= + + + +  (2) 
 
It is assumed that Eve was more than half the wavelength 
of two legitimate users so and was not correlated with and, 
in which was a channel characteristic measured by Eve from 
Alice and was a channel characteristic measured by Eve 
from Bob. Some measurements obtained by Eve are shown 
in Equation (3) and (4). 
 
[ (1) (2) (3) ... ( )]E E E E Eh h h h h n= + + + +  (3) 
 













Fig. 1 System model 
 
The coherence time cT  obtained from Equation (5) is the 
period in which two channel characteristics have a high 
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correlation with the channel assumed to be fixed. Some of 
the parameters that determine cT  are maximum Doppler 
shift Df  as shown in Equation (6), the speed of the user 
defined by v  and / cc fλ = . Probing channel mechanism 
affected by the probing rate is pr  and the sampling rate is sr  
[32]. Probing rate is the interval between the probing request 
and reply, and the sampling rate is the interval between the 
probing requests with one another. Measurement results are 
expected to meet the requirements of randomness then 
1
s cr T
− > while channel reciprocity will be fulfilled 
if 1p cr T





T f=  
(5) 
D
vf λ=  
(6) 
 
The SKG diagram block used to generate the secret key is 
based on the model proposed by [30] and shown in Fig. 2. 
There are six stages used to generate keys, which include 
channel probing, pre-process, quantization, information 
reconciliation, privacy amplification, and verification. 
Channel probing aims to collect channel characteristics 
within a certain time duration. We use received signal 
strength (RSS) as channel characteristics. Pre-process aims 
to increase the reciprocity of channel characteristics between 
two users, with the goal to reduce the KDR. Quantization 
used to change the channel characteristics of the pre-process 
results into bits, reconciliation of information will correct bit 
errors that occur between two users, privacy amplification 
will increase the quality of the resulting key to meet the 
entropy requirements, and the last stage, i.e. verification will 








Channel profile Initial key Synchronized key Secret Key
 
Fig. 2 SKG diagram block 
 
B. System Design 
We built the SKG scheme by the design shown in Fig. 2, 
where the scheme was implemented on 3 Raspberry Pi 
model B which acted as Alice, Bob and Eve. Alice acted as 
an initiator while Bob acted as a responder. Each device was 
equipped with a TP-Link TL-WN722N WiFi USB adapter 
and operated in 802.11b mode. The carrier frequency used 
was 2.4 GHz, while in the probing channel mechanism a 
periodical ping request was sent from Alice to Bob every 
110 ms as shown in Fig. 3. In this research, the coherence 
time that must be fulfilled was 104.16 ms (if we assumed 





λ = ≈ m, 
then 1.2 9.6
0.125D
f Hz= ≈ , so that 1/ 9.6 104.16cT = = ms). 
The periodical ping request has exceeded the coherence 
times. Therefore the randomness requirements were met. 











Fig. 3 Probing channel mechanism 
Data from the probing channel was recorded using 
Wireshark software and divided into blocks of data 
containing 50 samples before entry into the pre-processing 
stage. The pre-processing stage was performed using the 
Kalman method as proposed by [33] to increase the signal 
resemblance for each data block. 
In contrast to [20], we focused on split data blocks by 
BCH code to be used so it would show the level of influence 
of Kalman use towards performance improvement scheme 
built SKG. The next step was the quantization mechanism 
using the multilevel loss scheme proposed by [27], [28], and 
[33]. To overcome the bit mismatch caused by imperfect 
reciprocity, we used a BCH code at the information 
reconciliation stage. The BCH code used was (127.50). 
Before starting the privacy amplification stage, the number 
of samples in 1 block of data was converted to 256. This 
change aimed to adjust the number of bits in a data block to 
match the expected secret key length for AES of 256 bits. 
Universal Hash Function [29] used in the privacy 
amplification stage was to increase the entropy of the 
generated key. The selected data blocks were blocks of data 
that had the highest entropy. The final stage was verifying to 
ensure the secret key generated between two users was the 
same. Verification was done by sending a hash generated 
from SHA-256. 
C. Performance Parameter 
Four parameters of performance will be used to determine 
the success of the system is built, where the parameter 
includes the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient 
generated, KDR, KGR, and randomness. Detailed 
explanations of each parameter can be seen in the following 
summary. 
1) Pearson Correlation 
In this research, Pearson's correlation derived from 
Equation (7) was used to show the dependence between 
Alice and Bob measurement data. The resulting value ranged 
from 1 to -1, where the value 1 indicated absolute 
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2) KDR 
This parameter was used to measure the resulting 
mismatch bits after quantization. The value obtained was the 
ratio between the different bits eb  to the total bits b  
generated after quantization as shown in Equation (8). An 
increase in the value obtained would increase the workload 
from the information reconciliation phase to make a bit 
correction. 
      
ebKDR
b
=  (8) 
3) KGR 
This parameter was used to determine how fast Alice and 
Bob can generate the same key. There were 2 types of KGR 
to calculate, i.e., KGR included KGR after quantization 
( ikKGR ) and KGR after reconciliation ( rKGR ). KGR after 
quantization was performed to determine the efficiency of 
the quantization scheme as indicated by the number of bits 
of the initial key. KGR after reconciliation was used to 
determine the number of bits of synchronized keys.  
4) Randomness 
There were 6 types of randomness tests from the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) that were used 
to validate the generated secret key. The tests were the 
frequency test, block frequency test, runs test, the longest 
run of ones in a block test, approximate entropy test, and 
cumulative sums (cusum) test. For each test, the value p   
was used to determine the quality of the generated secret 
key, while the significance level α  was used to determine 
the boundary between random and non-random. If the value 
was p α≥ , then the key to otherwise fulfilled the 
requirements of randomness. NIST recommended values 
from 0.001 to 0.1 (0.001 0.01)α≤ ≤ which shows the 
randomness of the key was true with a probability of 99%. 
For cryptographic applications, the value chosen was 0.01 
[34]. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We conducted the test in an indoor environment to find 
out the performance of the combination of the Kalman 
method and a multilevel loss quantization scheme. The 
number of samples was 10,000.  
 
A. Experimental Environment 
The test was conducted during the day with a temperature 
of 24o Celsius in a room of 14.72-meters long by 8-meters 
wide. Alice walked according to the trajectories shown in 
Fig. 4 with a speed of about 1.2 m/s, while Bob and Eve 
were stationary at a very close distance (5 cm). The room 
consisted of a table, chair, and a glass cabinet. A glass 
cabinet blocked Alice and Bob. Nobody passed by the time 
of measurement. There were 3 experiments in this research, 
i.e., experiment 1, experiment 2 and experiment 3. Alice 
started the probing channel at a distance of 7.8 m 
(experiment 1), 9 m (experiment 2), and 10.8 m (experiment 
3) Bob. In each test, Alice went straight to the variations in 
the distance between 7.8 m to 8.7658 m (experiment 1), 9 m 




























 Fig. 4 Probing channel mechanism 
B. Performance Analysis 
The determination of the SKG scheme performance is 
carried out by testing in an indoor environment with various 
measuring distances. The tests included an increased 
correlation using Kalman, and the performance comparison 
between the uses of Kalman before quantization with direct 
quantization. The first test was conducted to determine how 
much influence the use of Kalman to increase reciprocity of 
legitimate users and eavesdropper. The second test was 
conducted to determine the comparison of performance 
between the use of pre-processing methods and direct 
quantization on various quantization schemes. 
1) Improved Correlation Using Kalman 
The results of the RSS measurement value of two 
legitimate users in all experiment ranged between -77 dBm 
to -48 dBm, the initial correlation for each experiment can be 
seen in Table 1. The correlation value is considered high if 
the resulting correlation coefficient is greater than 0.5 [35]. 
In this research, the correlation value generated between 
Alice and Bob in all scenarios was greater than 0.5, whereas 
the correlation value between legitimate users and the 
eavesdroppers was minimal, i.e., below 0.5. This resulted in 
the difficulty of eavesdroppers to get the same key as Eve. 
The measurement results showed that as the distance 
increased, the RSS data between Alice and Bob became 
increasingly different; consequently, the correlation was also 
lower. Detailed correlation values from RSS are shown in 
Fig. 5-7. The correlation value was obtained from the RSS 
data block, with each block containing 50 RSS data. The 
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selection of the amount of data for each of these blocks was 
adjusted to the BCH code used, i.e. (127.50). The test results 
show that the average correlation value of RSS data blocks 
between legitimate users mostly exceeded 0.5, whereas the 
correlation with eavesdroppers was mostly below 0.1. 
TABLE I 
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT OF MEASUREMENT RESULTS 

























Fig. 7 The correlation coefficient of RSS data block on experiment 3 
 
We used the Kalman method to improve the reciprocity of 
RSS data between two legitimate users. An increase in the 
correlation coefficient indicated increased reciprocity. In 
contrast to research conducted by [20], in this paper, we also 
included the security factor by ensuring that the correlation 
of the eavesdroppers did not exceed 0.5. In addition to 
improving the correlation coefficients of legitimate users, the 
use of pre-processing methods can also improve the 
correlation coefficient of eavesdroppers. There was an 
increase in the correlation of legitimate users as well as 
eavesdroppers in all scenarios as shown in Table 2. However, 
the increase did not happen to the data Eve got from Bob. 
The resulting correlation coefficient tends to decline in all 
scenarios. This condition occurs because data Eve obtained 
from Bob tends to be static, while Bob's RSS data as a 
legitimate user tends to be dynamic. We also show improved 
correlation results for each of the RSS data blocks in Fig. 8-
10. Overall legitimate user data experienced significant 
improvements, especially in experiment 2 and 3. 
Eavesdropper data in this case Eve's RSS data obtained from 
Alice also rose, but most still below 0.5. 
 
TABLE II 
IMPROVED CORRELATION COEFFICIENT OF MEASUREMENT RESULTS 






















































Fig. 8 Improvement of the correlation coefficient in experiment 1 
 
RSS data block



































Fig. 10 Improvement of the correlation coefficient in experiment 3 
2) Performance Comparison of SKG Scheme between 
Utilization of the Kalman Method and Direct 
Quantization 
Table 3 and 4 shows the comparison of SKG scheme 
performance between the utilization of the Kalman method 
as a pre-processes method before quantization with direct 
quantization. The results of the experiments performed 
indicate a decline in KDR from legitimate users in all 
experiments. In general, KDR values of the legitimate user 
that were exceeding 0.25 (25%) indicate the need for a pre-
processing method to reduce the KDR since the correction 
ability of BCH is 25% [15]. If the KDR exceeds 25%, then 
many data blocks are discarded because the BCH used is not 
capable of correcting the error. The test results also showed 
that the highest KDR obtained when we use 2-Ary 
quantization with KDR value in scenario 2 and 3 is above 
0.3 (30%). However, in terms of security, 2-Ary quantization 
is the most secure quantization method because it has a high 
KDR value between eavesdroppers with legitimate users, so 
the possibility to get the same secret key is also getting 
smaller. It is also interesting that the use of the pre-
processing method could increase the KDR between Alice 
and Eve on the Adaptive quantization method so that it could 
improve the security of the SKG scheme built. The results of 
ikKGR showing almost the same results for all types of 
quantization, with the lowest KGR, obtained when using 2-
Ary quantization. 
TABLE III 
PERFORMANCE OF SKG SCHEME WITH THE USED OF DIRECT 
QUANTIZATION 




MMB Alice-Bob 18.12 0.226 
Alice-Eve 18.11 0.245 
Bob-Eve 17.98 0.244 
2-Ary Alice-Bob 16.36 0.258 
Alice-Eve 16.36 0.500 
Bob-Eve 16.36 0.489 
Adaptive Alice-Bob 18.12 0.267 
Alice-Eve 18.11 0.283 
Bob-Eve 17.98 0.546 
2 
MMB Alice-Bob 18.15 0.223 
Alice-Eve 18.15 0.252 
Bob-Eve 18.02 0.245 
2-Ary Alice-Bob 16.36 0.324 
Alice-Eve 16.36 0.498 
Bob-Eve 16.36 0.496 
Adaptive Alice-Bob 18.15 0.263 
Alice-Eve 18.15 0.287 
Bob-Eve 18.02 0.549 
3 
MMB Alice-Bob 18.13 0.237 
Alice-Eve 18.13 0.245  
Bob-Eve 18.10 0.253 
2-Ary Alice-Bob 16.36 0.334 
Alice-Eve 16.36 0.491 
Bob-Eve 16.36 0.492   
Adaptive Alice-Bob 18.13 0.275 
Alice-Eve 18.16 0.279 
Bob-Eve 18.10 0.558 
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TABLE IV 
PERFORMANCE OF SKG SCHEME WITH THE USED OF KALMAN  




MMB Alice-Bob 18.16 0.195 
Alice-Eve 18.10 0.253 
Bob-Eve 18.12 0.252 
2-Ary Alice-Bob 16.36 0.245 
Alice-Eve 16.36 0.487 
Bob-Eve 16.36 0.505 
Adaptive Alice-Bob 18.18 0.178 
Alice-Eve 18.18 0.383 
Bob-Eve 18.18 0.571 
2 
MMB Alice-Bob 18.15 0.238 
Alice-Eve 18.12 0.242 
Bob-Eve 18.14 0.258 
2-Ary Alice-Bob 16.36 0.308 
Alice-Eve 16.36 0.484 
Bob-Eve 16.36 0.502 
Adaptive Alice-Bob 18.18 0.229 
Alice-Eve 18.18 0.397 
Bob-Eve 18.18 0.584 
3 
MMB Alice-Bob 18.16 0.264 
Alice-Eve 18.12 0.250 
Bob-Eve 18.13 0.249 
2-Ary Alice-Bob 16.36 0.396 
Alice-Eve 16.36 0.476 
Bob-Eve 16.36 0.499 
Adaptive Alice-Bob 18.18 0.229 
Alice-Eve 18.18 0.381 
Bob-Eve 18.18 0.585 
 
Figure 11 shows rKGR  of the legitimate user obtained 
from direct quantization. The highest rKGR  obtained from 
the MMB quantization of all experiments. This happens 
because MMB has the lowest KDR when compared to other 
quantization (as shown in Table 3 and 4). Fig. 12 shows 
rKGR  of the legitimate user with the addition of the Kalman 
method after quantization. The results of the tests show that 
Adaptive quantization yields a higher average KGR on all 
tests. The KDR generated by this quantization is also lower 
than the other quantization (as shown in Table 3 and 4). 
From all experiment, it could be seen that the combination of 
the multilevel loss quantization scheme with the pre-process 
method could improve the performance of the SKG scheme 
built. Table 5-7 shows the results of the NIST test on each 
experiment, where the test of the resulting secret key 
randomness has fulfilled the randomness requirements 






Fig. 11 rKGR  with the used of direct quantization 
 
Fig. 12 rKGR  with the used of Kalman 
TABLE V 
NIST TEST ON EXPERIMENT 1 
NIST Test Value of p   
MMB 2-Ary Adaptive 
Frequency 0.2 0.15 0.2 
Block Frequency 0.3 0.22 0.45 
Cusum (fwd) 0.05 0.3 0.25 
Cusum (rev) 0.4 0.35 0.1 
Runs 0.7 0.2 0.2 
Longest of runs 0.2 0.4 0.25 
Approximate entropy 0.8 0.31 0.22 
TABLE VI 
NIST TEST ON EXPERIMENT 2 
NIST Test Value of p   
MMB 2-Ary Adaptive 
Frequency 0.23 0.6 0.4 
Block Frequency 0.7 0.25 0.3 
Cusum (fwd) 0.6 0.56 0.2 
Cusum (rev) 0.5 0.7 0.1 
Runs 0.9 0.5 0.34 
Longest of runs 0.2 0.23 0.33 




NIST TEST ON EXPERIMENT 3 
NIST Test Value of p   
MMB 2-Ary Adaptive 
Frequency 0.02 0.13 0.24 
Block Frequency 0.1 0.22 0.33 
Cusum (fwd) 0.3 0.3 0.26 
Cusum (rev) 0.25 0.34 0.37 
Runs 0.4 0.7 0.44 
Longest of runs 0.3 0.2 0.87 
Approximate  
entropy 
0.2 0.3 0.11 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this research, we propose the use of Kalman as pre-
processing methods and multilevel loss quantization to 
overcome the trade-off issues of performance parameters of 
the Secret Key Generation (SKG) scheme. The results show 
that our propose SKG scheme can show better performance 
when compared with the use of direct quantization. The best 
performance is obtained from a combination of Kalman 
methods with Adaptive quantization, in which KGR and 
KDR generated are better than other quantization. Also, we 
also ensure the security of schemes built by ensuring the 
correlation value generated between legitimate users and 
eavesdroppers is less than 0.5, and the resulting KDR is 
more than 0.25 (25%). The resulting secret key has also 
fulfilled 6 random tests with p values greater than 0.01. 
Our future work consists of developing the SKG scheme 
by proposing a new pre-process and multi-bit quantization 
method in various types of indoor environments such as a 
line of sight (LOS) and non-line of sight (NLOS). The 
successful testing of the system is done by comparing the 
performance of the proposed scheme with the existing 
scheme. 
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